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
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A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alexander Nicolini".

ALEXANDER NICOLINI
Major, Infantry
R&D Coordinator

RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM AT FORT BENNING
RACE RELATIONS COORDINATING GROUP
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31905

PURPOSE

- To describe the Fort Benning Race Relations Program.
- To suggest improvements to that program.
- To provide ideas on race relations for other military organizations.
- To suggest functions for full-time staff personnel on an installation's Race Relations Coordinating Group (RRCG).

DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

1. Inclosure 1 is a list of working definitions that we have found useful in studying race and ethnic relations. At Fort Benning, however, race relations means essentially the interaction of blacks and whites. This is because all but a small percentage of our military and civilian community belong to these two groups, and the crux of our racial problem is black-white friction.
2. During the past year at Fort Benning, there have been suggestions to change our program scope from "race relations" to "human relations." We have rejected these suggestions because: (1) human relations is so all-inclusive that selection of specific missions and projects would be exceedingly difficult; (2) race relations in the Army is sufficiently serious and complex enough to merit concentrated effort; and (3) even though black-white relationships involve many general "human relations" factors, the crux of the problem is the socially defined, unscientific factor of race with all its stereotypes and prejudicial misconceptions.

THE PROBLEM

This paper discusses primarily programs and suggestions for dealing with race relations problems, rather than giving a detailed description of the problems themselves. One excellent article on race relations problems in the Army is "Briefing for Seminars on Racial Tension and Equal Opportunity," by LTC James S. White, who is in charge of Race Relations for the Army with Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel.¹ This was compiled in 1969 after LTC White's extensive, world-wide study of race relations. Also useful is "Race in the Military: The Tarnished Sword," by David I. Cooper, Jr., from The Retired Officer, February 1971. At Inclosure 2 are several books that we especially recommend as descriptions of the racial problems of the entire American society. These are useful since, in understanding race relations, we must think in terms of our entire society. In these references we find the following key words and phrases that help summarize the problem: prejudice, misunderstanding, pride and identity, impatience, lack of lateral and vertical communications, distrust, signs and symbols with racial overtones, paranoia, discrimination, institutionalized racism, polarization, tension, and violence.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORT BENNING PROGRAM

1. Extensive actions to improve race relations here began shortly after MG Orwin Talbott became Commanding General of the United States Army Infantry Center and Commandant of the Infantry School. In October 1969, the General convened a series of ad hoc, post-level seminars to determine the extent of racial problems at Fort Benning. ~~Discussions confirmed that the potential for trouble existed. Since that time a multifaceted program has been developed to not only eliminate discrimination and other racial problems, but also to positively affect interpersonal relations between blacks and whites.~~ Discussions confirmed that the potential for trouble existed. Since that time a multifaceted program has been developed to not only eliminate discrimination and other racial problems, but also to positively affect interpersonal relations between blacks and whites.

¹ Incl to letter, CONARC, dated 4 November 1969, subject: Racial Tension and Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel Seminars

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2. To help design and supervise the post's program, a full-time staff was selected and placed under the Infantry Center's Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA), Colonel J. W. Haley, and directly supervised by the Equal Opportunity Officer (EOO), Mr. Robert Galer. In March 1970, the staff began work and chose as its name the Race Relations Coordinating Group, or RRCG. The original members of the Group were 1LT James Jones, 2LT William Marshall, 2LT John LaFond, SFC Harry Green, and SP4 Michael Pearson. MAJ Carl Segal, Chief of Mental Hygiene, gave immeasurable assistance to the Commanding General and Coordinating Group in the innovative stages of the program. Another pioneer was LTC Richard McKee, commander of the 4th Bn, 69th Armor, who brought about a significant reduction in racial tensions in his unit by his enlightened leadership. Initially, our main effort was directed toward implementation of racial seminars at battalion and brigade level. The RRCG advised unit commanders on discussion topics and procedures and attended most of the seminars. A post Race Relations Advisory Council (RRAC) was also formed to act as a "think tank" on race relations.

3. By November 1970, the seminars were fairly well institutionalized and the Coordinating Group had begun to expand the program beyond the seminars. During that month, the DPCA, EOO, and RRCG, along with two of our Infantry School instructors, attended the DA Race Relations Conference at Fort Monroe, Virginia. At that time and until June 1971 the Group consisted of CPT Alvin B. Stroud, CPT William A. Richards, 1LT Marshall, SSG John L. McNeill, and SP4 Pearson. The Group presented a paper on our program and showed a videotape of one of our seminars. The Fort Benning party was impressed with the strong determination of the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, and, particularly, with DA's race relations action officer, LTC James S. White. Since the DA Conference, we have been expanding and revising our program, as described later in the paper.

4. Leadership Aspects of Race Relations: Somewhat paralleling the development of our program for the post's permanent military population was the adoption of race relations instruction for students attending the Infantry School. MAJ Tyrone Fletcher and MAJ James Hales of the school's Leadership Department, were primarily responsible for designing the four hours of instruction, "Leadership Aspects of Race Relations." During the past year, the Infantry School has trained instructors from other service schools to teach this sensitive class. Personnel of the Leadership Department also designed a class and trained instructors for Basic Combat Training programs. These successful classes are having impact Army-wide. Additionally, MAJ Hales and MAJ Fletcher significantly contributed to the plans for a Department of Defense Race Relations Institute which will train instructors for an educational program for both civilian and military DOD personnel. Today, the Infantry School and other service schools are striving to improve the race relations instruction, especially to include time for the students to learn experientially through discussions or seminars.

5. "Leadership for Professionals:" This 7-hour block of instruction, also designed by the USAIS Leadership Department, consists of four hours on mature leadership, two hours on race relations, and one hour on drug abuse. The class has had immediate impact on our non-student population since all unit and staff personnel, E-5 through O-6, were required to attend. Portions of this instruction are being adopted by the "Emerson Board" at Fort Bragg and should soon reach the rest of the Army.

RACE RELATIONS SEMINARS IN MILITARY UNITS

1. Definitions:

a. With the rapid expansion of the Army's race relations programs, the term seminar has been used to designate almost any type of gathering that deals with race relations. In this paper and in the Fort Benning program, we wish to be more specific with that term, in order to further develop the seminar as a means of improving race relations in military units.

b. A seminar is an unstructured discussion, in a relaxed atmosphere, in which everyone present may freely speak their views without fear of reprisals or verbal abuse and in which a moderator is designated to enforce agreed upon procedures. By unstructured we mean without a formal lesson plan or series of events. The atmosphere of the session is one that encourages frankness and honesty. A circular of non-classroom configuration helps achieve this. All interested personnel are invited to attend and participate in the discussion. Procedures are limited only by common rules of courtesy and order.

2. Goals and Functions of a Race Relations Seminar:

- a. To provide a forum in which subordinates of a military unit may present racial grievances and express attitudes on race relations.
- b. To educate participants on aspects of race relations by exposing each person to various learning experiences and by encouraging the individual to lower his defense mechanisms and reevaluate his own ideas.
- c. To encourage a healthy awareness of and respect for cultural differences between individuals of different races.
- d. To encourage participants to identify and change aspects of their behavior which hinder good race relations.
- e. To provide an additional, informal communications channel for the collection or dissemination of information on race relations.
- f. To give subordinates in a military unit the feeling of participation or the actual participation in decisions which affect the organization's race relations.

NOTE: Although these goals are ambitious and difficult to achieve; their vigorous pursuit is essential if racial tension is to be eliminated.

3. Participants: All unit personnel should be given the opportunity to attend race relations seminars. The Army leader should also realize that the people who need seminar exposure the most will probably avoid the sessions. To reach these people and give the seminars a representative cross section of his unit, the commander will have to select nonvolunteer participants. At times the leader may find that sessions without a cross section of the unit, such as seminars consisting of only officers or NCO's, are productive, to permit the maximum number of personnel in a unit to benefit from the seminars efficiently, the group should be as large as practical for controlled discussion (usually a maximum of 75).

4. Unit Level and Frequency:

a. Battalion-level seminars seem to be more efficient and productive than others tried at higher and lower levels. At these sessions, lower ranking participants seem far enough removed from their immediate supervisors to be candid, even with the battalion commander present. Battalion resources permit selection of a more effective moderator who, because he is not in the same company as most of the participants, will be better able to gain their confidence and establish his impartiality. With seminars held at this level post-wide, monitoring personnel (e.g., RRCG) can attend most sessions, whereas attendance at company meetings would be impractical.

b. In determining the frequency of his seminars, the commander must weigh many factors. Ideally, the seminars should reach everyone in the unit on a repetitive basis. However, the unit work load will restrict the amount of time that can be devoted to this effort. An honest appraisal of the level of racial tension must also be weighed. However, experience shows that racial tension, often dormant and difficult to identify, can develop very quickly. In most TOE battalions, a schedule of two seminars per month has seemed more appropriate. In some of these units, the battalion-level sessions were supplemented by company seminars, usually held monthly.

5. Seminar Moderator:

a. The key man in a successful race relations seminar is the moderator. Before each session he should plan how to introduce new topics in case discussion lags or digresses from race relations. If he is using resource personnel or materials, he should plan their use. During the session, he tries to build up participants' self-confidence and encourages the comments of those who are reluctant to speak. During controversies, he keeps order and tries to pick out points of agreement between the

² As a minimum, the seminars should reach the unit's leadership structure, influential militants and emergent leaders from the soldiers' ranks.

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arguing parties. Throughout the seminary, he encourages participants to recommend solutions to the problems raised. He also summarizes results and conclusions for the Group. At the end, he insures that the session concludes on a positive note, with participants leaving encouraged, not alienated. The moderator would normally be responsible for reporting the conclusions of the sessions and following up on questions or complaints before the next seminar.

b. The moderator obviously must be open-minded, tolerant, and impartial. Previous experience and interest in group dynamics is desirable. In a military setting, an officer seems to be more effective in a moderator role than is a soldier or NCO. Because of the requirement for frequent liaison with the battalion commander and staff, the moderator should work in the headquarters or headquarters company.

6. Content of the Seminars: In each session the moderator should encourage discussion of in-unit racial problems, since these have the greatest chance of being solved. However, in many sessions the discussion will drift to the surrounding civilian community or to societal issues. This will also be productive since most racial tension results from the accumulation of experiences and grievances, both military and civilian. This latter reason also explains why moderators should inject discussion topics, even sensitive or emotional issue, for consideration of the group when participation lags. In doing this, the skilled moderator is not "stirring up trouble," but rather is trying to get at the underlying causes of the seemingly ever-present racial tension.

7. Resources and Aids: The seminar moderator or commander should invite the participation of personnel well-versed in race relations or human relations, e.g., members of the post's Race Relations Coordinating Group, chaplains, social workers, and psychologists. The session would also benefit from visitors directly connected with a popular discussion topic, such as military and civilian police representatives or civilian realtors or businessmen. Movies on race relations are especially productive in starting discussions. Books and magazines are another way to generate discussion on the uncomfortable issues that divide the races.

8. Role of the Commander: Many commanders prefer to moderate their unit seminars. There are several disadvantages of this. Simply by virtue of his powerful position, the commander will have difficulty establishing his impartiality as moderator and his presence may overwhelm participants who would otherwise speak up with complaints or attitudes. Thus, the seminar may develop into a normal "commander's call," which is useful, but which cannot achieve the most important goals of a seminar. Additionally, the commander has severe time limitations. He cannot adequately plan and follow-up seminars, preview and utilize discussion aids, or attend moderator training programs. A preferred role for the commander would be listener and participant. Then could he benefit more from the discussion and also review his own behavior and attitudes. The commander may prefer to enter an ongoing seminar unnoticed or be on call for lively discussion segments.

UNIT RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

1. General:

a. The program described in this section uses a model a combat arms battalion and its subordinate companies or batteries. Most of the recommendations are also valid for other small units and should be useful for brigade and division commanders.

b. Omitted from this section are the many techniques and principles of good leadership and management, such as "Know your men," that contribute to high morale, job satisfaction, and unit esprit. These, in turn, help reduce interpersonal friction, racial or otherwise. Some leaders believe that these techniques are all that is necessary to reduce racial tension. In most Army units today, however, other actions are needed, primarily because most of the prime ingredients of racial tension are not formed strictly by experience in that unit alone.

2. The most important aspect of the program is the race relations seminars described separately in the previous section. In the descriptions of other aspects below, little mention is made of staff responsibility for particular actions. Instead of adding all of these to the duties of various staff officers, we recommend that many of the actions be assigned to a person designated and trained as

moderator for the seminars. This part-time race relations moderator and action officer should provide added continuity, aggressiveness, and commitment to the unit program.

3. Advisory Council:

a. A second important aspect of the program is a council to advise and assist the commander. This function cannot effectively be served by the seminars. With its constant turnover of personnel and its instructed format, the seminar is often repetitive and lacking in specific conclusions. The commander cannot expect very many constructive suggestions to come out of it. The council, on the other hand, would have a permanent membership of carefully selected personnel, generally representing all views in the battalion, who could effectively discuss recommendations to help the unit's race relations. We recommend that membership include at least black and white leaders from the soldiers ranks, interested and key NCO's, a platoon leader, company commander, and appropriate staff personnel. To get more complete feedback from the grass-roots, the commander may want one enlisted representative, elected or appointed, from each platoon in the battalion.

b. Purpose of the Advisory Council:

- (1) Provide a forum for the discussion and evaluation of the unit's racial problems and programs.
- (2) Act as informal information channel between the commander and his soldiers.
- (3) Supplement the seminars as a means of presenting complaints and problems to the commander.
- (4) Advise and assist the commander in any other ways as directed.

c. A properly planned Council, meeting regularly, should provide the commander with better feedback and recommendations than he could receive by attending all the unit's seminars. If this is achieved, the commander should not feel compelled to attend every battalion-level seminar, but rather should monitor them as he does other unit activities.

4. Battalion Mass Meeting: This is a technique successfully utilized in one post unit early in the program. The goal of the session was to expose the greatest number of personnel to race relations policies and issues. The commander usually began the session with a statement of his policy and commitment to end discrimination and lower tension. In some sessions a movie was then used to stimulate subsequent discussion. In others, the commander used a panel, composed of spokesmen of the black and white soldiers as well as some unit leaders. The panel discussed issues and answered queries from the audience. The commander moderated the meeting, closing it with a reaffirmation of policy and a challenge to all attendees to evaluate their attitudes and behavior to insure they are free from bias. These mass meetings in the 4th of the 69th Armor Battalion were very effective due primarily to the leadership of the commander, LTC Richard McKee. Other units may find this technique productive, especially after a serious racial incident or when tension seems dangerously high and there is a need to reach all personnel in a hurry. A variation of this technique is a meeting utilizing a guest speaker or a panel including personnel outside the unit. Again soldiers should have the opportunity to ask questions or raise other racial issues. Carefully planned, the mass meeting is another means for the airing of frustrations and anger in a controlled environment. It also can achieve some of the important goals of a seminar, while reaching a larger number of people.

5. Conferences for Leaders: The selling point of this technique is that the unit leadership, compared with the soldiers, has a longer retainability, more impact on unit effectiveness and is generally more conducive to change. Thus, the productive return for effort expended can be greater than for seminars. The restraining factor again is the time available to pull leaders away from their work sites. As a minimum, leaders should be briefed on and have an opportunity to discuss unit policies that affect race relations. Also recommended is an educational effort using films, books or military publications. In this effort, the moderator again would be a valuable staff asset to the commander.

6. Race Relations Classes: At Fort Benning, the only actual race relations classes which affect our personnel are those given in Basic Combat Training, in Army service schools, and as part of "Leadership For Professionals." A more decentralized education program at battalion level is unlikely at this time, primarily because of the lack of a system for training qualified instructors. The real "guts" of

race relations is not substantive matter that could be written into a training manual; rather, it is the emotional conflicts that demand a sensitive, highly trained instructor. Thus, the educational aspects of race relations are likely to remain centralized at installation level, in service schools, and at training centers.

7. Racial Polarization:

a. Extract from "Race in the Military: The Tarnished Sword" by David I. Cooper, Jr. (Incl 3):

It is natural and normal for people with similar interests to group. In the military, it could not be considered abnormal for young blacks and whites to have members of their own racial groups as members of their interest groups, there is considerable difference of interests.

But when such groupings evolve into racial polarization and a major group interest is protection from, or the exclusion or persecution of, others because of a different skin color, it threatens not only mission accomplishment but the integrity of the military structure and system.

On one hand, we see blacks who expose themselves to hurt and frustration every time they are in contact with whites, withdrawing into an environment which often supports aggressive anti-white behavior and gains strength out of unity against discrimination. On the other hand, whites, confused by signs, symbols and slogans, threatened by the spectre of cross-racial assault, uptight over rumors of impending confrontation, withdraw from contact. There evolves an entire "us" and "them" system; "our" music and "their" music; "our" club (or corner of the club) and "their" club; "our" part of town and "their" turf. Infringements--oral, physical or ideological--however innocent or well-meant, invite summary retribution. Members of either group seen associating with "them" are regarded with suspicion and disdain, and are caustically reminded (orally and/or physically) of their allegiance.

b. Small unit leaders have a responsibility to help curb racial polarization. Commanders should insure that barracks bays, sections of bays, cubicles, and NCO rooms do not become segregated, i.e., all one racial group. This must be done very covertly without detection, otherwise a severe backlash, especially from black soldiers, is likely to ensue. For example, unless violence has erupted in segregated barracks, the company commander and first sergeant, should not forcibly move soldiers or NCO's to achieve racial intermixing. Rather, they should do it by planned placement of incoming personnel into particular squads and particular sections of the barracks. The importance of doing this and doing it right cannot be overemphasized. Segregated barracks help perpetuate racial stereotypes, distrust, rumors, and violence. Even though integrated barracks are not necessarily a haven of racial harmony, they are a necessary prerequisite to the lowering of tension.

c. Similar goals should be kept in mind for reducing polarization in mess halls, clubs, etc. However, in this area effective techniques are more elusive. In this mess hall, a white platoon leader might join a group of his black soldiers for coffee. Possibly, the presence of his white face among the blacks might help combat the suspicions of other whites. In clubs, the most common technique is the use of a variety of music and entertainment appealing to all races. But, as in the mess hall, segregation in seating will still likely be widespread.

d. Unit functions, such as athletic and social events which require racial intermingling and promote unit esprit, can also help reduce polarization. Still, we need new ideas on how to carry over to our everyday dealings the fleeting racial cooperation often achieved in these activities. However, the young black soldiers may be increasingly suspicious of this aspect of the program. He knows that whites have traditionally been courteous and patrollingly respectful of black athletes and entertainers. Yet, these same whites have continued to support unequal education, job discrimination, and political impotency for blacks. Many young blacks in the Army will consider athletics, not as a way to promote racial harmony, but rather as a way to improve their work environment and demonstrate a superiority over whites.

8. Black Visibility: This is defined as the presence of blacks in commonly esteemed positions where they are often seen by lower ranking soldiers. Examples are command and staff supervisory positions, clerks, military police, and other selective jobs. In most units, black visibility is low primarily because of the small percentage of black lieutenants (about 2%) and captains (about 4%) in the officer corps, as well as the low number of blacks in specialized MOS's; the latter is due to the Army selection process using aptitude tests scores and civilian experience. The black soldier often sees this low visibility as evidence that: (1) he cannot get ahead in the Army; (2) the system is run by whites for the benefit of whites, with little input from blacks; and (3) the system is insensitive to blacks and their needs. Higher visibility is primarily the task of higher headquarters working on policies of recruitment, MOS selection, and retention. However, the small unit commander can also help himself. He can transfer qualified personnel to higher visibility positions, e.g., from the motor pool to the battalion headquarters. To a limited degree, he can retrain personnel or send them to training courses. He can insure that blacks have an equal opportunity to become soldier of the month. Visibility is also important in unit publications, posters, pictures, etc.

9. Promotions: To date, no official study has detected racial discrimination in promotions. However, complaints are very common, and the perceived discrimination is just as serious a matter for leaders. To preclude actual discrimination, a commander should closely monitor the promotion system, which includes the provision for minority group representation on promotion boards. To combat misconception of discrimination, the commander must have open channels for complaints and an effective information system. Leaders must also work to dispell the notion that blacks must work harder than whites to be promoted.

10. Military Justice: Several official studies and informal queries indicate that blacks have a higher rate of disciplinary actions than whites. However, we know of no substantial evidence that there are significant differences in the types of offenses committed by, or sentences imposed on members of different races. The differences in rates may be due to a higher rate of infractions by blacks; it may be due to discrimination that taints recommendation on whether a black offender should receive a verbal reprimand, Article 15, or court-martial. Neither factor can be accurately determined. If there is a higher rate of infractions by blacks, it is probably due primarily to their frustration and dissatisfaction with the service. The overall race relations program helps deal with that factor. Discrimination in the reporting of offenses may take the following form: an NCO finds a white soldier sleeping in the motor pool when he should be performing maintenance; the NCO verbally reprimands the soldier; the same NCO finds a black soldier sleeping; the NCO recommends an Article 15 for the man. Perhaps in this case the NCO would justify his action by saying the soldier was lazy, a mal-content or misfit. In any case, commanders should be alert to discrimination in the recommendations they receive on who should be punished.

11. Racial Signs, Symbols and Epithets:

a. Black soldiers have often been criticized for their use of the so called "Black Power" salute by whites who consider it a threatening gesture or inappropriate in a military environment. To most blacks, it is merely a gesture of solidarity and recognition. Leaders should regard it as no more threatening than the "peace" or "victory" sign. The leader who criticizes or tries to ban the use of these symbols will lose much respect and rapport with his troops. The same guidance generally holds for posters and slogans. Items like "Black Power" posters and Confederate flags should be tolerated, although slogan-like "Kill Whitey" and Ku Klux Klan type literature should be strongly discouraged. However, all Army leaders should avoid association with either type symbol. Since it will usually be initially preceived as pro-black or pro-white and destroy the leaders' claim of fairness and impartiality. The Army leader with a Confederate flag on his car has very little chance of ever convincing his black soldiers that he is anything but a racist. Right or wrong, that is the way it is.

b. The leader should not allow the use of abusive terms such as spade, nigger, honkie, pig, etc. Today's leader should recognize that the word "colored" is also considered offensive by the vast majority of young blacks. The sensitized leader will use "black" when it is necessary to identify that racial group. The term "boy" is one of the most offensive terms to blacks. Yet, some Army leaders justify its continued use by saying that it is a habit of speech or that they mean no harm by it. Such insensitivity to the feelings of others should not be tolerated by commanders.

12. Racial Complaints:

a. The chain of command is the primary means for personnel to air complaints about equal opportunity and treatment. In many cases, however, the black soldier either encounters obstacles or perceives the command structure as uninterested and unresponsive. Sometimes the complaints are about leaders in the chain of command itself. Complementing the command channels must be a credible open-door policy. The race relations seminars are also an important channel for the airing of complaints.

b. It goes without saying that prompt and decisive action must be taken to resolve complaints. Results must be adequately disseminated. Lack of action, either actual or perceived by troops, causes bitterness and distrust of the command structure.

c. Leaders must be sensitive to patterns as well as individual instances of discrimination. It may be that specific complaints from a particular unit or about a particular policy are found to be invalid, based on an investigation. However, if there are several complaints and general animosity about the same thing, then something is wrong.

d. Often it is difficult for black soldiers to gather facts and statements to support a general complaint of discrimination. The burden of proof should not be on them, but on the commander. Initially, the leader should treat each complaint as valid, since to the soldier it is very real. Investigation should then determine the validity of the complaint.

e. Surveys of black troops indicate that their complaints seem to cluster around areas in which the discretion of their officers and NCO's is greatest. In the Army, if the small unit leader wants to cause difficulties for some group, he has the power to do so, if only by condemning them for minor deficiencies he overlooks in others. The commander should be sensitive to the possibility of real or even perceived discrimination in these discretionary areas like duty assignments, passes, and recommendations.

13. Militants and Emergent Leaders:

a. Every organization will have individuals who emerge as spokesmen or leaders and who consequently have strong influence over others. Army leaders can identify these leaders among their black and white soldiers. In a military unit, vocal militants also have considerable influence over peers, even if for no other reason than because of their vehemence and audacity. Recognizing the power of these individuals, the commander should at least identify who they are. For an effective race relations program, the commander should also bring these men into the power structure formally (in fact, they already are in the structure, but possibly not in cooperation with the duly appointed leaders). The leader should strongly encourage and, if necessary, require these men to attend regularly the racial seminars. He should appoint to the Advisory Council those who are open-minded and want to contribute to decisions affecting race relations. The commander and his subordinate leaders should periodically talk with these individuals about troop morale and reactions to command policies. Additionally, he can check to see how well information is being disseminated. Commanders may find it useful to appoint a black spokesman as his driver or enlisted assistant so that they will have more opportunity to receive direct feedback from the "grass-roots." Leaders should use all these techniques only to improve intra-unit communications, not to try to "control" or neutralize the soldiers' leaders and spokesmen.

b. The benefits of this policy are similar to, but more pronounced than for other policies, such as Soldiers' Council, in which subordinate personnel are formally brought into the power structure. Effectively utilized, this policy should:

(1) Improve the vertical flow of information in the unit; help get complaints rapidly aired and resolved; help get rumors identified and cleared up.

(2) Increase and improve the input to the commander on problems and programs affecting race relations.

(3) Reduce the troops' feelings of powerlessness and indifference.

(4) Improve the image of the commander and Army leadership; promote an image of open-mindedness and concern for the troops.

(5) Help combat extremist views on racial issue; encourage the controlled use of the enthusiasm of radicals or militants.

c. Contrary to some objections, it does not necessarily follow that this cooptation will cause the soldiers' leader or the militant to lose his position of influence. In any event, with high personnel turbulence, there will likely be new emergent leaders and radicals every six months in the unit.

14. Communications:

a. In a racially tense unit, we usually find that blacks and whites are interacting on the basis of rumor, assumption, customs, misunderstanding and radical influences. The commander must insure that relevant facts are adequately disseminated to prevent this. A local example illustrates this situation. In one unit, black soldiers were very angry about the rumor that a black company commander was relieved because of his race. The brigade commander heard about the rumor and disseminated the correct facts, comparing that commander's performance with that of others in the unit. Emotions quickly cooled. Complaints about Project Transition selection are usually cleared up when the commander can provide troops with the racial breakdown of participants.

b. An effective information program can help avoid these crises. In the program, the criteria for success is what gets all the way down to the soldier. Unfortunately, the written word, if it reaches him, is often not read by the trooper. What is needed is an imaginative system in which all the unit's leaders believe and participate. The system should also include use of councils, seminars, and other informal channels as previously mentioned.

15. Command Support: The key to the whole unit program is command support. Some of the techniques mentioned above are innovative and will be resisted by conservative leaders. The commander must continually back the program and get more subordinate leaders actively involved in it. In an enlightened and committed manner, the commander must lead the way.

RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM AT INSTALLATION LEVEL

1. General:

a. Support of the unit program described previously should be the prime function of the race relations program at installation level and at all headquarters above battalion level. Some of this support directly affects the unit, such as the conduct of training programs for seminar moderators. Some aspects have wider impact, such as the increased stockage of commissary items preferred by black customers. All combine to promote racial harmony and equal opportunity and treatment.

b. The descriptions that follow combine what is now being done at Fort Benning and what should be done here and throughout the military to improve race relations. This section is a compilation of our experiences on what can and should be done.

2. Responsibilities: Most of the staff work on the program is done by the post's Race Relations Coordinating Group. During monthly meetings with and in periodic memoranda to the Commanding General, the Coordinating Group gives direct feedback on all aspects of the race relations program and its affect on post personnel. The Group also drafts race relations policy documents and statements for the Commanding General. However, our procedure is not to consolidate all race relations efforts under the RRCG or Director of Personnel. Our goal is the participation of all units, staffs, and individuals in the effort to improve race relations. The RRCG's role in relationship to other staffs officers mentioned below is generally one of coordination and assistance.

3. RRCG Assistance to the Unit Race Relations Program:

a. Working full-time on race relations, the RRCG acquires the experience and expertise to advise and assist unit leaders on all aspects of their program. This is done through staff visits, attendance at unit race relations activities, and other means suggested by commanders. The Coordinating Group

should recommend improvements in the content and procedures of racial seminars, conferences and council meetings. Upon request the Group can assist with classes or orientations for incoming unit personnel.

b. The RRCG helps commanders evaluate race relations techniques and coordinates the dissemination of these to other units. The Group also develops new guidance and resource material for use in the field.

c. Being authorized frequent meetings with the CG, the RRCG can also highlight unit problems and needs that require post level command attention. This convenient channel should not be abused, however. If commanders perceive the RRCG is unfairly portraying their unit, then they will be reluctant to seek the Group's assistance.

d. The RRCG has a major function of processing and disseminating to units all information helpful to their race relations. Some information is put out in a form suitable for posting on the bulletin board or handing out to troops. The bulk of the information, however, is sent to commanders for dissemination as they deem appropriate. By establishing a policy binder and file designations (USAIC Circular 600-30), the Group has also helped the commander organize his information.

4. Moderator Training:

a. The use of a trained moderator is a prerequisite for a unit seminar to progress beyond being merely a "gripe" session, command lecture, or question and answer period. Without some training, an appointed moderator will probably have difficulty initiating and controlling discussion and preventing his personality from affecting his functioning. Race is an emotional subject, potentially explosive; the discussion leader needs all the group dynamics training available.

b. Lacking extensive behavioral science expertise to conduct moderator training sessions, the RRCG has relied extensively upon the post hospital's Mental Health Consultation Service (MHCS). Of great assistance have been the post clinical psychologist, CPT John Laszlo, and two social workers, SP5 Daryl Connor and PFC Terry Duke. They have conducted several training sessions designed to teach potential moderators important aspects of group dynamics and communications theory especially as they apply to race relations. To date, the sessions have been 8 - 12 hours long. Plans are being made for a 5-day session, including extensive input by the RRCG on racial issues and programs.

5. Seminar Techniques and Resources:

a. In support of unit programs and moderator training, a new member of the RRCG, 1LT Phillip C. Lyman, is preparing a handbook on race relations seminars for commanders and moderators. This will include suggestions on planning and conducting seminars, as well as the use of films of videotape. 1LT Lyman has also contacted various civilian and military sources in an effort to expand our inventory of films on race relations. Screening of new films is in process, and we hope to have recommendations ready shortly. Our experience is that films of the caliber of the recently purchased "Black and White Uptight" are very useful in both educational and seminar programs.

b. Another innvocation being considered is the attendance of certain influential citizens of the surrounding community at unit race relations seminars. In such discussions, participants would discuss off-post treatment of military personnel and various issues affecting race relations in the surrounding community. Out of such sessions hopefully would come a "cross fertilization" of mutual benefit. The greatest difficulty in this program seems to be the preparation of the civilians for the uncomfortable position they will be in at the seminars.

6. Battalion and Brigade Commanders Meetings:

a. These meetings have been convened quarterly by the CG, with key staff personnel and the RRCG attending. The purpose of the sessions was to discuss unit race relations problems and programs. Additionally, to help increase the commanders' awareness of aspects of race relations, we have shown and discussed a videotape of a productive seminar, a CBS News segment on racial problems in Europe and the movie "Black and White Uptight." Probably because of the presence of the Commanding General, comments from commanders focused primarily on positive aspects of the

program and were thus of limited value as evaluation. However, commanders were receptive to new ideas presented or discussed, as evidenced by subsequent improvements in most unit programs.

b. Similar conferences would be useful for unit NCO's and company commanders. These could be held at each brigade or centralized at post level.

7. Race Relations Advisory Council:

a. The post level Council has basically the same purposes as the unit councils. The Director of Personnel acts as discussion leader and chairman of the Council. The Commanding General usually attends at least part of each meeting. Other personnel for the Council are selected by heads of units and key staffs. If the RRCG knows of someone who would be an asset to the Council, they suggest to the appropriate supervisor that the individual be selected. We do not consider Council members as actual representatives of their unit or staff. Generally, we are seeking a perceptive and concerned person who can give us new ideas. We tell each member to familiarize himself with the race relations program and how it affects his organization. Since he is not an actual representative, we do not require him to report back to his organization on Council findings. This is done through normal command or information channels.

b. The Council should meet at least quarterly. The RRCG plans and helps conduct the meetings and is usually responsible for follow-up actions. Part of each meeting should be the upward flow of information on unit problems, programs, and new ideas for post level consideration. The RRCG and other staff officers should also use the Council to get reactions to proposed projects and policies. Some meetings could be devoted entirely to one aspect of the program, such as offpost housing discrimination. For this, the RRCG would invite the participation of the Housing Referral Office, a representative of community's real estate board, and others who could contribute to the discussion.

8. Research: If it has sufficient academic expertise, the RRCG should conduct research to learn more about the causes of race relations problems and to evaluate the program's success in a more exact way. Usually, however, the RRCG would be in the role of providing assistance and coordinating for more expert consultants. To date, our research experience has been mainly with surveys of soldiers' attitudes about race relations. Another function of the Group would be to make recommendations on the subsequent utilization of research findings.

9. Chaplain: In recognition of the importance of the unit chaplain in helping race relations, a human relations workshop was held for all chaplains on post. A member of the RRCG also attended. As the overall program progresses, chaplains should be brought into a more active role both in the units and at post level.

10. Provost Marshal: In increasing black visibility, we have been helped by a completed Department of the Army project which increased to 12.5% the percentage of blacks in military police enlisted career fields. To improve the racial awareness of our military police, race relations seminars are held regularly in the MP companies. The Provost Marshal also processes complaints about treatment of soldiers by civilian police. Most complaints, as in the civilian community itself, have been from blacks against the predominately white police force. Police brutality was one of the explosive issues in recent civil disturbances in Columbus and appears to be a continuing irritant.

11. Inspector General: The Inspector General, as one of the soldier's alternatives to the command channel, has extensive impact on race relations. A year ago this impact was negative because of the low confidence soldiers have in the IG. As recommended by the RRCG, the IG then appointed two young captains, one black and one white, to act as ombudsmen for post soldiers. Their mission is to handle soldiers' complaints and requests for assistance. This augmentation seems to be improving the image and credibility of the IG.

12. Libraries, Commissary, PX and Concessions: A year ago these facilities were the subject of complaints about the lack of items generally preferred by black customers. DA action solved some of the problems. However, local action, sometimes under the advice of the RRCG, was necessary to complete the task. We are continually sensitive to complaints in these areas and generally find deficiencies easy to correct. Post barbers and beauticians have attended several workshops to teach

them about the styling and treatment of Negro hair. However, this still does not insure equally skilled treatment of blacks' hair. A great help would be a black barber and beautician in each shop around post.

13. Post Clubs: Little progress has been made at post level in our attempts to reduce racial polarization in NCO club branches. For several months, bands were rotated around the annexes to eliminate the informal designation of one branch as the "soul" club and another as the "country and western" club. Although the schedule was widely publicized, members did not follow their favorite bands to other club annexes. Club patronage decreased, and financial losses increased. An experiment with disc-jockeys playing the most popular records of all types of music had little effect. The clubs are now back to their usual schedule. To help insure that at all annexes courteous treatment is given to club members, regardless of race, the club custodian has instituted a training program, including race relations, for waitresses and bartenders.

14. Infantry Museum: As a result of complaints from black careerists and recommendations by the RRCG, the Infantry Museum has recently increased its representation of minority group soldiers. A temporary exhibit on the 24th Infantry Regiment is now being displayed. One Negro mannequin is being used in the Airborne exhibit and another is on order. Research is underway for a display on black Medal of Honor winners. Plans for exhibits in the new Infantry Museum will take into account the contributions and heritage of minority groups in the Army.

15. Modern Volunteer Army Program: As this program removes unnecessary irritants to the soldier, improves his life style and generally betters the Army, the effect on race relations is and should continue to be favorable. Also important to the racial situation is the recruitment of blacks, especially those with officer potential, to a service career. The RRCG has had some input into the promotional activities of VOLAR. However, we see the key to recruitment being the elimination of prejudice and discrimination in the service - in essence, the achievement of the goals of our entire race relations program.

16. Off-Post Housing Discrimination: As the result of an RRCG recommendation, the post's Housing Referral Office recently took special steps to uncover covert off-post housing discrimination. For a 60-day period special briefings were given to all personnel processing through the office. This briefing encouraged the individual to watch for and report situations in which he (1) was denied the opportunity to rent vacant housing, (2) was subject to sudden unexplained raises in rent, or (3) was shown only housing in a racially distinctive residential section (e.g., predominantly black area). No complaints of housing discrimination were reported. We recognize that racial discrimination in housing continues to exist and off-post residential areas remain segregated. What is needed is more imaginative and aggressive measures to uncover the cleverly disguised discrimination.

17. Off-Post Treatment: With "off-limits" authority now delegated to the Commanding General, soldiers are being encouraged more than ever to submit complaints if they have been subjected to racial discrimination in the surrounding communities. However, the number of specific complaints which can be investigated remains low. One reason for this is the soldier's continuing distrust of the system or his lack of motivation to "hassle" with making a complaint. Thus, we need to keep stressing our concern and sincerity. Another reason is that much of the discrimination is covert; yet, we can still do something about these, if soldiers come forward with them.

18. Community Relations:

a. Military assistance to the community in the area of race relations has taken several forms. Two men active in our post program are citizens of Columbus and serve on racial advisory councils downtown. Several military people including two from the RRCG have done volunteer work at an assistance clinic called the Open Door Community Center. Post personnel also assisted in the planning and initial conduct of racial seminars for local city government officials.

b. During the period of high racial tension in the surrounding community in May and June 1971, the Commanding General formed an ad hoc advisory body including some unit and staff personnel, the DPCA and RRCG. The group formally met three times to discuss the various crises facing city officials and the impact of the tension on the post. At all times the consensus of the group was that

the military should keep a "low profile," but communicate to key officials our recommendations and concern. This action seemed to be quite effective and should be continued if the need arises again.

19. Infantry School:

a. As mentioned earlier, the Leadership Department gives a two-hour class on race relations, as part of "Leadership for Professionals," to all post leaders E-5 through O-6. This has had a favorable impact on post race relations.

b. During the past year the RRCG has assisted the School in several ways. It has suggested improvements to race relations classes for leaders and recruits. During training programs for race relations instructors, it has helped plan and participated in sensitivity training sessions. The Group has also briefed the potential instructors on the post program and participated in discussions on racial issues.

20. Civilian Education Program: The training division of the Civilian Personnel Office is studying an RRCG suggestion on a race relations education program for civilian employees. This suggestion was the result of many soldiers' complaints about the racial insensitivity of civilian supervisors and civilians who have frequent contact with troops.

21. Information Officer: The Information Officer, with assistance from the RRCG, performs several on-going measures which help improve race relations. He publicizes Army policy and local policy on equal opportunity and treatment. He prepares command information topics to stress the positive aspects of the race relations program. He insures adequate coverage of minority group contributions to the service. The Information Officer also has an active role in many of the post activities cited previously, including VOLAR, advisory councils, and community relations.

RACE RELATIONS COORDINATING GROUP

1. General:

a. If one agrees that the Army has a serious racial problem and that the program outlined here can probably help lower racial tension, then the next question is how to implement the actions. Some say that the existing organization can do it - that there is no need to create a special staff office. A weakness in this argument is the lack of success in this approach over the last several years. More importantly, we feel that complexity and seriousness of racial problems requires full-time personnel, at least for several years until the necessary procedures and individual sensitivity are built into the Army system.

b. At Fort Benning we were able to find five people who we thought would be effective working full-time on race relations. The naming of the Group was arbitrary, but now seems descriptive. The general concept and naming of the Group is likely to be adopted by other posts in the Army, since it is part of the Modern Volunteer Army Master Plan (Annex D).

2. Mission of the RRCG:

a. Advise the Commanding General and the Director of Personnel and Community Activities of the Infantry Center on the causes of racial tension and assist with programs to improve race relations among post personnel.

b. Advise and assist post units and staffs in efforts to promote racial harmony.

3. Functions:

a. The many functions of the RRCG are covered in the preceding description of the overall program. Generally, the Group is the primary staff action office for measures which directly affect race relations. It also acts as a post-level ombudsman for black and other minority soldiers, as well as an advocate for the equal opportunity and treatment of all personnel. On occasions, members of the Coordinating Group act as personnel staff officers, educators, discussion leaders, information specialists, social workers, investigators, researchers, and management consultants.

b. The Group is a full-time forum for the discussion of problems and programs. It is an open-door for new ideas and evaluations. It is also a central clearing house for all types of information of use in our programs and, upon request, programs of other organizations.

4. Personnel Qualifications:

a. Generally, our goal is a multiracial mixture of officers and soldiers of various ranks. As much as possible, each person should possess some expertise, experience, ability, and interest in human relations, preferably race relations. At least one person should have post-graduate work in sociology or psychology, again preferably emphasizing race relations. For a large Army post, the OIC of the group should be a major.

b. The Group must have a combination of viewpoints and backgrounds. Some members must be able to establish rapport with young blacks and whites in order to gather "grass-roots" information. This role would normally be filled by a young lieutenant, NCO, or low ranking soldier. Equally important are members with several years service who have a greater understanding of the Army and the attitudes of its older careerists. In other words, all sides of the problem should be represented in the Group. Only with this balanced membership can the RRCG effectively initiate and supervise programs specifically designed to cope with race relations in the Army.

5. Selection of Personnel:

a. Some of the personnel for the Group may be identified through normal AG channels, although some desired characteristics will not be on forms, but rather must come out in interviews. The post that is just starting an RRCG will probably have to assign personnel gradually, as they are identified. Members already on the Group may identify good prospects during their visits to post units. Prospective members should be able to stay with the Group at least twelve months.

b. Some career officers or NCO's who show high potential for the job may express reservations about being assigned because of the stigma about this type of job. The Director of Personnel can help the individual by assuring him of the importance of the job and emphasizing that the assignment will not be detrimental to his career. It is ideal if qualified personnel do volunteer for the job, but it is not necessary. Our experience has been that once an individual learns more about the race relations, he becomes interested and committed.

OBSTACLES TO A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM

1. Many obstacles to the success of a race relations program already have been mentioned throughout this paper. The more general problems cited below are of a magnitude that can easily subvert our efforts.

2. "Don't Stir Up Trouble": Many leaders will misunderstand the efforts to lower racial tension. They will see the program as only stirring up soldiers, especially when on the surface a unit seems quiet. They will misunderstand measures designed to prevent outbreaks of tension. Our mission should not be to keep soldiers quiet and "in their place," but rather to eliminate degrading treatment and unequal opportunity. In the process of uncovering problems, people will get "stirred up." But, gone are days when whites could debate what privileges and rights should be granted to blacks. There is no longer the option for American leaders to conduct affairs as usual. Violence has already erupted in both the civilian and military communities. As we make headway in eliminating discrimination and prejudice, then we will have less turbulence. David Cooper quotes a young Marine as saying, "Too many people think this thing can be waited out and that it will soon be mint juleps on the verandah again. Well, no way."

3. Unbalanced View of the Problem:

a. Some whites think of themselves as having no race. When they say "race" they mean blacks. A "race" problem means a problem with the blacks. Racial violence or a racial assault means it was committed by a black. Consequently, they blame racial problems primarily on blacks although they will occasionally admit to blaming overtly prejudiced whites like members of the Ku Klux Klan. We must all share the blame and the burden for a solution. Who in this country can say that he has done

all he could to insure equal opportunity and treatment for all? It is meaningless to say, "I have never discriminated," or "I used to be prejudiced, but since I came into the Army, all that has changed." More whites need to discard their pretense and share in solutions.

b. Because of the tendency to view race relations as a black problem, there is also a tendency to be predominately concerned with attitudes of blacks. However, whites' attitudes concerning race relations are important and must be considered, since any action which ignores 87% of the Army is out of balance.

4. Paranoia and Contrived Grievances:

a. Complicating racial problems is the fact that some complaints from blacks are the result of misunderstandings or false perceptions. These grievances may be the product of a paranoia that the black man could understandably develop while growing up in America. He expects unfair treatment, especially in an organization like the Army that is controlled predominantly by whites. This concept must be understood when discussing race relations. It is another example of why we must view the problem in the context of the entire society.³

b. A smaller number of grievances come from a minority of blacks who are seeking preferential treatment or just want to "mess with" the system. This further complicates the problem, especially when it alienates whites who are seeking solutions.

5. Hiding the Problem: As in any organization, we have a tendency to hide negative aspects of our area of responsibility, since this reflects poorly on ourselves. Army commanders need to encourage subordinate leaders to be candid with race problem. Hiding the problem can make it worse. Since the causes of racial tension are distributed throughout society, the leader should not feel or be judged personally responsible for overt manifestations of problems.

6. Low Prestige: An obstacle to getting more careerists actively involved in the race relations program is the low prestige of equal opportunity and treatment work. Additionally, few people would regard it as enhancing to a military career. Thus, there seems to be very few careerists interested in full-time work in this area. These attitudes also hinder the effectiveness of groups like the RRCG. Members of the Coordinating Group may be seen as people with a "hang-up" on race relations or as careerists frustrated because they were put in a "dead end" job.

7. Resistance to Attitude Change: Most race relations problems are caused basically by individual attitudes, distorted by prejudice, stereotypes, and paranoia. Racial harmony will evolve only after changes in individual attitudes. Even though it is so important, attitude change is not a practical goal for Army programs. Attitudes develop over many years and must be changed voluntarily by the individual. Intensive sensitivity training and other sophisticated measures can speed the process. However, this seems to be too expensive and impractical even to be done for careerists in key positions. Yet, in an aggressively executed race relations program, at service schools and in units, we can change behavior and create an environment conducive to positive attitude change.

8. "It is not the Army's Fault": Some leaders resist devoting more resources to improving race relations on the basis that society is to blame and the Army cannot change society. As one unit seminar report put it, "Because racial prejudice is carried into the service from civilian life, it is not the Army's fault." Who is to blame is not the issue. Racial tension is detrimental to troop morale and consequently affects fighting efficiency (it will also severely hamper the successful accomplishment of civil disturbance missions.) As a Commanders Call article stated, "To ignore racial hostility on the grounds that commanders are not social engineers is to disregard the commander's traditional responsibility for insuring the welfare and morale of his troops, and for keeping them ready to perform all assigned missions."

³ Commanders should read Black Rage by Cobbs and Grier for an excellent discussion of black paranoia.

9. Apathy: At Fort Benning, overt racial tension has declined over the past year. Hopefully, this is the trend Army-wide. However, there is danger that the subsiding of overt violence will cause the race relations program to lose steam before it is fully implemented and institutionalized. Assuming that tension will continue to plague society especially in urban areas, we can expect that the Army will also be plagued by black frustration and paranoia and white insensitivity and bias. If the program is not fully implemented, tension will probably continue to rise and fall in the years to come. The implementation of an effective program will be difficult enough, even with a committed majority of Army commanders. If we become apathetic or think the problem has passed, then the task will be impossible.

THE FUTURE

Personal Note: One year ago a contemporary was told about our work on the RRCG, his response was "How did you get stuck in that?" Today, we find some of our peers reading Soul on Ice or telling us about how they became interested in race relations as company commanders in Europe. We hesitate to call this a trend, but it is encouraging.

So where do we go from here? Obviously, the recommendation of this paper is the implementation of the described program which is the result of the last eighteen months of experimentation. Once implemented the program should be evaluated, revised, and lessons learned passed on to others. Supporting the installation programs should be a great emphasis by service schools on equipping leaders with the knowledge to cope with race relations problems and supervise programs. Officers in advance courses and senior service schools should not only receive classes, but also participate in intensive discussion groups and awareness sessions. NCO's must be reached by both unit and school programs.

The Army can no longer push racial problems down the hall to the Equal Opportunity Officer or expect that a few people can come up with the solutions. We need more active participation by more leaders. We need to get all of the leadership to cross the line from being part of the problem to being part of the solution. We must have a better understanding of the young soldiers, black and white, who are products of our American society. We must not try to strip them of their identity and fit them into an olive drab mold.

The Army has great potential to improve race relations; at every stage in the development of race relations in America, the military has led the way and it must continue to exemplify the best of America's traditions. With enough commitment from enough people, we can go a long way toward achieving racial harmony, increase our effectiveness and set an example for other institutions in our society.

Fort Benning, Georgia
21 July 1971

DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. Human Relations: Interpersonal behavior which facilitates or hinders mutual understanding and cooperation in pursuing common goals and which affects interpersonal friction caused by real or imaginary differences. Human relations in this frame of reference deals with a study of basic human factors which are influenced by heredity and environment and form the basis for friction and/or harmony in interaction between peoples of all races, cultures and social strata.
2. Race. A human group that socially defines itself and/or is socially defined by other groups on the basis of physical characteristics, i. e., skin color, hair, skull, facial features, etc. In turn, people may incorrectly believe that these physical characteristics are intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other nonphysical attributes or abilities, such as ambition, cleanliness, dependability, and innate intelligence. In the contemporary United States some commonly recognized major racial groups are whites, blacks, chicanos, American Indians, and Japanese Americans. Of decreasing importance today is the supposedly scientific definition of race: the various divisions of the human species each group having in common certain hereditary characteristics such as skin color, skull shape, bone structure, etc. Anthropologists have devised different classification schemes that range from three (Caucasian, Negro, and Mongoloid) to more than forty races. These schemes become imprecise when applied to highly mobile, pluralistic populations, as in the United States, made up of millions of people with mixed backgrounds. An example of the unscientific nature of the hereditary or genetic schemes: the offspring of a black and a white is socially considered a Negro, unless he can "pass for white." As a categorization of people, race has no objective meaning independent of its social definition.
3. Race Relations: The relationships between groups and members of groups that have been socially defined as races on the basis of physical criteria.
4. Racism: The belief that organic, genetically transmitted physical and biological differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of offensive distinctions between groups socially defined as races.*
5. Ethnic Group: A group of people socially distinguished primarily on the basis of cultural criteria (e. g., language, life style, religion, mores, national origin, etc.) Examples are Italian-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Jewish-Americans. The social definition often includes stereotypes and misconceptions about the attitudes and behavior of the group.
6. Minority Group: A classification of people who because of their numerically smaller size and economic, racial or cultural characteristics, are usually separated (voluntarily or involuntarily) from others in a society for separate and frequently unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority group implies the existence of a dominant group with higher social status and/or greater privileges. Minority status carries with it exclusion from full participation in the life of the culture.

Prepared By: Race Relations Coordinating Group
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

*Derived from Race and Racism, by Pierre van der Berghe.

COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDED READING LIST

The following reading list contains those books that the Race Relations Coordinating Group considers the most informative in the area of race relations; however, the reader must understand that these books do not give hard and fast answers to the problems in race relations, they only show the forms and background to these problems with some general advice on how to combat them. Realizing the demands placed upon the commanders' time it is recommended that the books be read in the order given, with special emphasis placed upon the Kerner Commission Report.

1. Kerner, Otto, Chmn., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, US Government, 1968.

The conclusion of this commission, created to investigate the causes behind the urban riots of 1967, was that "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal." This report should have the prime consideration of the commander since it explains the reasons for a great deal of the frustration that the blacks in this country feel, the reasons that it takes a violent form, but at the same time dispels the fears that such outbursts are anything more than spontaneous outbursts.

2. Silberman, Charles, Crisis in Black and White, Vintage Press, 1964.

Considered a classic in the area of sociology, Silberman shows the the "Black problem" in this country is actually part of an overall problem, a problem composed of black and whites.

3. Grier, William H. & Cobbs, Price M., Black Rage, Bantam Books, 1968.

A psychological study of the black man in America which describes the emotional conflicts and desperation which he feels, the result of a living heritage of slavery. One of the important points brought out by this book is the paranoia from which many blacks suffer, even when such feelings are not justified.

4. Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Grove Press, 1964.

A vivid description of what it feels like to be a black man in America, Malcolm X describes his relations with Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims, and why they totally reject anything connected with white culture.

5. Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, 1963.

A black psychiatrist who served with the French Forces in Indo-China and Algeria, Fanon expresses his belief that the "colored races of the world are oppressed by the white races" and that the only way to combat this oppression is through the use of violence by the 3d world movement.

6. Cleaver, Eldridge, Soul on Ice, Dell Publishing Company, 1968.

An autobiography by one of the leaders of the Black Panther Party, this book should be read with care. While it is one of the most volatile and popular of the books by black authors, it is not the definitive statement on the causes and solutions to the problems of blacks in America.

7. Brown, Claude, Manchild in the Promised Land, Signet Books, 1965.

The author, who grew up in Harlem, attempts to tell how it feels to grow up in a ghetto, knowing that there is almost no chance of ever escaping, of ever finding a better life.

8. Baldwin, James, Notes of Native Son, Bantam Press, 1955.

Baldwin, a highly articulate black writer, examines America and the race situation, with special emphasis on the black attitude toward the whites in their struggle for survival in an hostile environment.

INCLOSURE 2

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